Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that there is certainly no difference between treaties and ex post-Congress executive agreements. Failure to reject the zero hypothesis differs from the evidence of the zero hypothesis. The number of ex post executive agreements in the sample is small. Therefore, the failure to reject the zero hypothesis may be due simply to large standard errors due to data scarcity. This is especially true for models (2) (5), which include a large number of covariates, resulting in data savings in many subgroups. The fact that almost all model specifications provide negative coefficients certainly allows a larger number of data to obtain a statistically significant difference, although a small one. However, it is important not to fetishize this dichotomy. With a few exceptions, neither the hypotheses described nor their respective authors purport to explain the executive`s motivations in a way that leads to particularly strong policy recommendations. Instead, in formulating the hypotheses, most commentators are open to the idea that the role of the treaty can only be fully explained if several of the proposed mechanisms are taken into account. 25 treaties and other international agreements: The role of the United States Senate, 106 Comm.
Print 5 (2001) (detail, which the Presidents claimed as the foundation of the executive branch in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution; its power as Commander-in-Chief in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1; its power to negotiate under Article II, Section 2 Clause 2; its power to receive ambassadors in Article II , Section 3; and its duty to the faithful application of the laws of Article II , Section 3). This study should examine whether the commitments in the form of a contract are far more sustainable than those made as agreements between Congress and the executive branch. The analysis suggests that this is indeed the case. If all the characteristics observed are maintained at a constant level, an agreement adopted as a treaty takes longer statistically and materially than a similar agreement in the form of an executive treaty. This applies to all model specifications and even assuming that the shortest 10% of permanent executive agreements are exclusive executive agreements that could not replace the treaty. The United States is an international anomaly in that it has two largely interchangeable commitment mechanisms to conclude the vast majority of its agreements with other states. Footnote 1 An instrument is the treaty. The treaties follow the procedure of reclamation and approval under Article II of the Constitution, which requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate for a treaty to be ratified and internationally binding. Footnote 2 Instead of the treaty, commitments can also be made in the form of an agreement between Congress and the executive branch, which requires only a simple majority, both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate.
Executive agreement, an agreement between the United States and a foreign government that is less formal than a treaty and is not subject to the constitutional requirement for ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. Unlike previous studies, this article takes a more direct approach to comparing congressional contracts and executive agreements, which do not require equally strong assumptions. At the heart of the study of the differences between the two political instruments is a simple question: if a particular treaty is concluded as a treaty between the United States and a partner country, will it result in a different outcome than the agreement reached as an agreement between Congress and the executive branch? If the answer is yes, it indicates that the treaty is qualitatively different from the agreement between Congress and the executive branch.